Dogfight Under a Carpet...
Kadyrov & Prigozhin vs. Lapin & Beglov
Churchill allegedly compared Russian politics to a “dogfight under a carpet.” Well, things constantly change only to stay the same…
Here is another piece for those in "Russia watchers" community who would like to have a better insight into the driving forces of the Russian politics. This time this is an article by Anatoliy Nesmiyan, a.k.a. El Murid, a Russian publicist and a person who is consistently negative in his assessment of anything. With Anatoliy the glass is always half empty. But regardless of his negative bias, I find his opinion interesting and prognosis accurate in some cases. This article is dedicated to the under a rug fighting that is happening between Kadyrov-Prigozhin tandem and some of the high ranking generals in the Russian army and even people of a higher standing in power hierarchy, like St. Petersburg governor Beglov. Specifically their joint attack on a three star general Lapin, commander of the Central Military District appeared to have a success, as general Lapin is reported to have taken a leave of absence for health reasons and he is not expected to come back to lead the Central Military District again. Now two star general Mordvichev, commander of the Mariupol operation, was appointed as a provisional commander of the Central Military District he is expected to become an appointed commander if situation at the front will develop favorably for the troops under his command.
I'm taking opinion by Anatoliy Nesmiyan with a grain of salt, but I have to agree with him that situation for the Putin's power vertical has become much shakier since the start of the SMO, as we see people of the second or even third echelons of power, like Kadyrov and Prigozhin, who start influencing if not dictating some of the decisions. But something that Nesmiyan doesn't touch upon, but I think that can be interpreted as a trend, people who'll come to replace Putin are going to be much less convenient figures for the West than Vladimir Putin. Putin has based his foreign policy over the twenty years in power on deals and constant concessions that eventually lead the the need of a drastic military action with changing goals and uncertain outcomes. Because of his pacifying and agreeable policies Baltic states are now NATO members since 2004, that is why anti-Russian coup d'etat won two times in Ukraine in 2004 and 2014, that is why Russia's supposedly closest allies like Kazakhstan are fully supporting Western sanctions against Russia and so on and so forth. People who if or when will come to replace Putin in Russia are going to be much less convenient "partners" for the West. In the absence of a clear victory against Russia it is in the Western interest to keep Putin in power for as long as possible as he continues to be basing his foreign policy strategies on the principles of deals and concessions.
Important to note - feeling certain shakiness of Putin's power vertical those who want to grab the power in case of drastic changes (with or without Putin) are beginning to get more active, and not just inside of Russia, but outside as well. On November 4 - 7 congress of Free Russia is planned with participation of opposition figures that were once upon a time elected in Russia as deputies at the federal or regional levels, but later left the country. Congress will take place in the Polish town of Jablonna, just outside of Warsaw and is expected to create a government in exile. Support for these types of oppositioners in Russia is traditionally less than 10%, now even more diminished by the fact that many in opposition left the country to escape mobilization, but, nonetheless, these forces are getting to be opportunistically ready in case if those who are inside the country would miss their chance due to internal disputes.
As usual, article below was translated using bulk translation services and manually edited to make sure the text is readable in English. Moreover, I provided additional comments in brackets to give additional context.
Material below is a translated article by Anatoliy Nesmiyan.
It is reported that Prigozhin (Russian businessman, owner and founder of Wagner, private military company actively deployed in Syria, Africa and now Ukraine) went on the offensive against the governor of St. Petersburg Beglov (governor that mandated the harshest COVID measures in Russia against the businesses and people of the region), and this is no longer about the usual internal apparatus squabble, but about a real war. Against the background of a coordinated attack on the army by the Kadyrov-Prigozhin tandem (Kadyrov - head of Chechnya, former separatist fighter, now taking active part in the war in Ukraine), activity in the new direction looks logical on the one hand - success needs to be developed. On the other hand, when people of the second echelon begin to pose a threat to the interests of the upper echelon, and Beglov is not by himself, he is a protege, so he personally is an indirect target in this story, then this can launch a full-fledged war in the ruling caste.
Meanwhile, there is nothing surprising. When they say that there are no social ladders in today's Russia, they say it in relation to young cadres. But social ladders are cut off for systemic people as well. They are all at the ceiling of their capabilities, although they want more. And all revolutions and coups have as a driving force those people who reached their ceiling, and further social advancement is associated for them with the demolition of the previous system.
The collapse of the Soviet Union turned out to be beneficial for the "upper middle class" of the USSR, which was also in a dead end, above which it could not rise - either by virtue of moral and business qualities, or by virtue of origin. The same Gaidar (liberal reformer, first prime minister of Russia after collapse of the USSR) and the entire group of "young reformers" under no circumstances had a chance to rise above their positions (and primarily in terms of business qualities - as we later saw when they demonstrated these qualities). The same goes for Putin within the Soviet system he would have reached his maximum at the district level and no higher, and the whole current ruling clan - worthless people in all respects. But the collapse gave them a chance, and in the situation of chaos it was their human qualities - complete unscrupulousness, lack of moral boundaries and willingness to commit any crimes - that turned out to benefit them. Chaos generally loves such an audience.
So now the situation is exactly the same. People who have no chance of promotion, but have ambitions, are ready to do anything to get their chance. And they consider the absence of moral restrictions as their competitive advantage over laggards and dummies who have cleaned up the political space to sterility but lost their grip at the same time.
Another question is that revolutionaries are not suitable for a normal life, they are only good at destroying. And if they are not removed after the revolution, then either chaos begins to reproduce itself, or the new winners are forced to cement their own regime, protecting it from other revolutionaries. Starting a new cycle of stagnation.
It is extremely difficult to break out of such a circle. It can last without end.
And a new one from Prigozhin. He really becomes the main newsmaker in that lifeless thing called "Russian politics".
Prigozhin said that it is necessary to attract the children of oligarchs to participate in the SMO — "until their children go to war, the full mobilization of the country will not happen." Without this, the elites are in a state of "uninterrupted comfort".
In fact, Prigozhin goes all-in, which on the one hand gives him a chance, no matter how paradoxical it may sound, with support the forces of the second echelon like him, who clearly understand that they have no chance in Putin's "stability", on the other - the current nobility, concerned about the appearance of such forces, will try to shoot them down on approach. Including the most brutal methods.
In fact, the chance of a second outcome is still significantly higher, especially since the fate of all revolutionaries is usually sad: they can still demolish the old system, but they will not be allowed to reach the new one. The second generation of revolutionaries usually eats the first, the most radical ones. Leaving several living icons, the main condition of which will symbolize the connection of generations. Prigozhin clearly does not pull on the role of a silent symbol, even if successful.
But the appearance of such figures is inevitable. By the way, it is another marker of a full-blown catastrophe in one of the last stages before the final shift. Six months ago, it was simply impossible to imagine an independent system politician of the second echelon. Now they are starting to appear like mushrooms.
Putin's “brotherhood” has become bloated and bronzed, enshrined in their exclusivity. Now it will be demolished, and not by some students from Bolotnaya (square in Moscow where mass protests of 2012 took place), but seemingly by their own. And even if the “Ozeretsky brothers” (from co-op Ozero - lake - in suburbs of St. Petersburg, exclusive gated community for who-is-who in the region including Putin, were initial alliances were formed in the 1990s) solve Prigozhin's problem by using the methods of the old days, as they solved things in St. Petersburg in the nineties, it will not change anything. The liquid mess that their vertical has turned into is spreading.
Valuable writing. Thanks.
Hello Stanley: This was a very interesting article. Please keep them coming. JM